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This study investigates whether an earnings announcement that decreases 
disagreement about fundamentals can simultaneously increase disagreement about 
price. Kondor (2012) develops a rational expectations model in which the presence of 
short-horizon investors can lead to a polarization of higher-order beliefs about price 
(i.e., beliefs regarding the opinions of other investors), even as a public 
announcement reduces disagreement about fundamentals.  I empirically investigate 
this theoretical finding using analyst forecast dispersion and implied volatility to 
proxy for differences of opinion about fundamentals and price, respectively.  
I predict and find a positive association between the presence of short-horizon 
traders and both the likelihood and extent of divergence between changes in price 
disagreement and earnings disagreement around earnings announcements 
characterized by decreasing forecast dispersion (i.e. earnings announcements that 
decrease disagreement about fundamentals). Further, I document that the association 
  
is stronger following good news announcements than following bad news 
announcements consistent with more precise public signals triggering higher-order 
disagreement.  
In additional analysis, I employ abnormal announcement period volume to 
measure disagreement about price. Using this alternative measure, I continue to 
document a positive association between short-horizon ownership and the extent of 
divergence. Taken together, these findings suggest that higher-order beliefs play an 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Intuition tells us that a firm’s public disclosures should reduce differences in 
opinion. Yet, a growing empirical and theoretical literature documents that this is not 
necessarily the case. Recent theories examine the role of higher-order beliefs, that is, 
an agent’s opinion about the opinions of others, in investor disagreement. These 
models suggest that higher-order beliefs can affect how changes in expectations on 
fundamentals translate into prices (e.g., Allen, Morris, and Shin, 2006; Gao, 2008; 
Kondor, 2012). These models raise an interesting question: Can announcements that 
decrease disagreement about future earnings simultaneously increase disagreement 
about price? This study empirically examines this question by investigating whether 
the presence of speculative investors increases higher-order disagreement about price 
following an informative earnings announcement.   
 From a fundamental trading perspective, the notion that a public 
announcement can increase disagreement about price while decreasing disagreement 
about earnings seems counterintuitive. Indeed, traditional asset pricing models set 
price as a function of future cash flows and hence by extension future earnings (e.g., 
Ohlson, 1995). However, models of higher-order expectations suggest that this result 
is possible, and perhaps even expected, in the presence of short-horizon investors. A 
speculative investor relies on the notion that he can resell his shares to a more 




on fundamentals than on his higher-order expectations regarding the intermediate 
stock price.
1
   
Kondor (2012) offers a useful theoretical explanation in a rational 
expectations framework. In his model, the presence of short-horizon investors with 
heterogeneous private beliefs causes a divergence in higher-order expectations in 
response to a public announcement that otherwise decreases disagreement about 
fundamentals (i.e., earnings). The intuition is similar to Keynes’s (1936) argument. 
He posits that investors “are concerned, not with what an investment is really worth 
to a man who buys it ‘for keeps,’ but with what the market will value it at, …three 
months or a year hence.” Short-horizon investors are primarily concerned with the 
resale price of the stock. Upon a public announcement, they combine the consensus 
opinion (i.e., price) with their own private information.
2
 The informative public 
announcement together with this private information leads to a polarization of higher-
order beliefs. 
Opinion divergence in capital markets has received increasing attention in 
accounting and finance, especially with regard to its role in asset pricing.
3
  
Theoretical “difference of opinion” (hereafter, DO) models suggest that opinion 
divergence can result from heterogeneous prior beliefs, different likelihood functions, 
or both (e.g., Varian, 1989; Harris and Raviv, 1993; Kandel and Pearson, 1995). In 
                                                 
1
 In this context, speculation is defined as in Kaldor (1939) as “the purchase (or sale) of goods with a 
view to resell (re-purchase) at a later date.” Accordingly, I classify investors as speculative based on 
their interest in the resale value of the stock, rather than its fundamental value. The distinction is key in 
models of higher-order expectations where the law of iterated expectations fails in the presence of 
heterogeneous investment horizons (Allen, Morris, and Shin, 2006). 
2
 Kim and Verrecchia (1994) expand the concept of private information to include superior 
information- processing skills. 
3
 For instance, prior research examines the effect of disagreement on the cost of capital (e.g., Garfinkel 
and Sokobin, 2006; Doukas et al., 2006) and overpricing in the presence of short-sale constraints (e.g., 




these models, investors do not necessarily condition on price, but rather can “agree to 
disagree” based on their own private beliefs. In rational expectations equilibrium 
models (hereafter, REE), investors do condition on price, and heterogeneous beliefs 
come about due to differences in private information or differential information-
processing abilities (Kim and Verrecchia, 1991, 1994, 1997). Empirically, while prior 
studies find that divergence of opinion occurs around some earnings announcements 
(e.g., Morse, 1991; Kandel and Pearson, 1995), what causes this disagreement and 
whether it reflects disagreement with respect to both fundamentals and resale price 
are less clear. Moreover, while the theoretical implications of higher-order 
disagreement suggest that it is important in understanding how accounting disclosure 
shapes investor beliefs, the role of higher-order beliefs has received little attention 
empirically.
4
 The purpose of this paper is to examine whether, in the context of 
earnings announcements, the presence of speculative investors can exacerbate 
disagreement about future stock price as disagreement about future earnings 
decreases. 
To evaluate changes in differences in opinion around earnings 
announcements, I measure disagreement about fundamentals and price using analyst 
forecast dispersion and option-implied volatility, respectively. Analyst forecast 
dispersion and implied volatility are useful in this context for several reasons. First, 
both variables can be easily measured before and after an earnings announcement, 
which allows for a change analysis. Second, both measures are forward-looking, and 
                                                 
4
 Notable exceptions are Elliot, Krische, and Peecher (2010) who examine higher-order beliefs and 
reporting transparency in an experimental setting and Balakrishnan, Schrand, and Vashishtha (2012) 
who test the role of higher order beliefs (measured using the concentration of analyst 




disagreement is an ex-ante construct; in contrast, measures of disagreement using 
realized values may be confounded by look-ahead bias. Third, both measures are 
frequently employed in the literature as proxies for uncertainty, and thus the paper’s 
implications can be easily applied to existing literature.
5
  
In Kondor’s (2012) model, short-horizon ownership and heterogeneous 
private information are necessary for rational speculation (and hence, the generation 
of higher-order disagreement). I rely on two proxies for the speculative appeal of a 
stock, each reflecting one of these necessary conditions. The first is the percentage of 
“transient” institutional investors identified using the Bushee (2001) classification 
scheme. This measure most closely captures the construct of short investment horizon 
employed by Kondor (2012).
6
 The second proxy is the idiosyncratic volatility of 
earnings. This measure reflects the ability of investors to obtain or develop 
heterogeneous private beliefs about future earnings and captures the appeal of 
speculation following earnings announcements for firms whose earnings contain 
more firm-specific news.  
Utilizing both binary and continuous measures of the extent of divergence 
between changes in disagreement about price and fundamentals, I first document that 
decreasing forecast dispersion (i.e., decreasing disagreement about future earnings) 
combined with increasing implied volatility (i.e., increasing disagreement about 
                                                 
5
 Although I use the terms disagreement and uncertainty somewhat interchangeably, there are key 
differences between the two. For instance, analysts can agree on a point estimate while individually 
being uncertain about their own estimate. Conversely, analysts can disagree on a point estimate while 
each is certain of her own estimate. I rely on a large macroeconomic literature that investigates the 
association between forecast disagreement and uncertainty, and finds that while dispersion is, by 
definition, disagreement, it can serve as a suitable proxy for uncertainty (see Lambros and Zarnowitz, 
1987; Bomberger, 1996, 1999; Giordini and Soderlind, 2003). At the market level, it is reasonable to 
assume that a high level of disagreement suggests uncertainty about the true parameter value. 
6
 Throughout the paper, I use “transient” and “short-horizon” inter-changeable to describe the investing 




future price) occurs for a non-trivial 23% of sample earnings announcements. Next, I 
test Kondor’s (2012) theoretical predictions, which apply to announcements that 
decrease disagreement about fundamentals, by focusing attention on the subsample of 
announcements with decreasing forecast dispersion and investigating the relationship 
between the speculation proxies (i.e., short-horizon ownership and idiosyncratic 
earnings volatility) and divergence between changes in dispersion and implied 
volatility. I find that short-horizon ownership and idiosyncratic earnings volatility are 
positively associated with both the likelihood and extent of divergence. Thus, 
consistent with Kondor (2012), speculation appears to induce an increase in higher-
order disagreement as the precision of public information increases. This result 
highlights the importance of considering higher-order beliefs when assessing the 
information role of earnings announcements. 
It is possible that the nature of the earnings news – that is, “good news” versus 
“bad news” – affects the association between speculation and higher-order 
disagreement. On the one hand, prior research demonstrates that bad news 
announcements can increase implied volatility (e.g., Rogers et al., 2009; Truong et 
al., 2012). On the other hand, bad news announcements may be less informative 
about future earnings, suggesting a diminished information role.
7
 Additionally, to the 
extent that bad news leads to more pessimistic opinions, the price will be less 
revealing since investors with negative outlooks may be hindered by short-sale 
constraints (e.g., Miller, 1977). When price is less revealing about average valuations, 
short-horizon investors will condition on it less, leading to a lower divergence of 
higher-order beliefs. To investigate the role of the nature of the earnings news on the 
                                                 
7




association between speculation and higher-order disagreement, I repeat the main 
analysis separately for good news announcements and bad news announcements. I 
find that, consistent with the latter view, the positive association between speculation 
and divergence of fundamental and price disagreement exists only for good news 
announcements.  
In additional analysis, I employ abnormal share turnover (i.e., volume) as an 
alternative proxy for disagreement about price. I find that, consistent with the main 
results, short-horizon ownership and idiosyncratic earnings volatility are positively 
associated with the divergence of abnormal volume and changes in forecast 
dispersion around earnings announcements that reduce fundamental disagreement.   
Finally, I employ absolute announcement period returns as an alternate 
measure of the precision of the public signal. Gao (2008) suggests that when the 
public signal is more precise, short-horizon investors condition more on price, 
resulting in a greater price reaction to earnings announcements. Consistent with this 
argument, I find that the association between speculation (i.e. short-horizon 
ownership and idiosyncratic earnings volatility) and disagreement about price (i.e. 
changes in implied volatility and abnormal turnover) is significantly more positive for 
announcement characterized by the highest quintile of absolute returns than for 
announcements in the lowest quintile of absolute returns.  
This paper makes several contributions to the accounting and finance 
literatures. First, the results shed additional light on the role of disagreement in asset 
pricing. Prior research provides mixed evidence on whether disagreement combined 




and Scherbina, 2002) or whether it is a priced risk factor (e.g., Qu et al., 2003; 
Anderson et al., 2005, Carlin et al., 2012). In the context of earnings announcements, 
the negative association between ex-ante disagreement and announcement-period 
returns (Berkman et al., 2009) is seemingly at odds with the negative association 
between announcement-period returns and changes in forecast dispersion (e.g., Rees 
and Thomas, 2010). If, as my evidence indicates, speculation can induce an increase 
in price disagreement as fundamental disagreement decreases, this can help explain 
these apparently contradictory results. In particular my evidence suggests that 
distinguishing between first- and higher-order disagreements can improve our 
understanding of the asset pricing implications of disagreement.  
Second, evidence that, in the presence of speculative investors, an 
announcement can be informative about near-term earnings while simultaneously 
increasing uncertainty about price has important implications for studies examining 
the information content of earnings. Earnings informativeness is often measured 
using the market’s reaction to the announcement (i.e., the earnings response 
coefficient). Under a Bayesian updating framework, high pre-announcement 
uncertainty should lead investors to rely more heavily on the earnings announcement, 
resulting in a greater earnings response coefficient. However, empirical results 
indicate that the opposite is true – higher ex-ante dispersion is associated with a lower 
earnings response coefficient (e.g., Imhoff and Lobo, 1992; Yeung, 2009). Similarly, 
evidence from prior research investigating price and volume reactions to 
announcements suggests that both must be used to accurately assess investor 




ownership can exacerbate differences in opinion about price, then the informativeness 
of earnings depends on whether and how the announcement differentially affects 
fundamental and higher-order expectations. Additionally, while firms may disclose 
accounting earnings with the intention of decreasing uncertainty, the results suggest 
that a firm’s disclosure choices in the presence of speculative investors can have the 





Chapter 2: Literature Review 
2.1 Higher Order Beliefs 
In his seminal work The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money, 
Keynes (1936) compares professional investors to participants in a fictional 
newspaper contest in which entrants are asked to choose the six  “most beautiful” 
women from a set of 100 photographs. Those who choose the most popular pictures 
are eligible for a prize. Keynes argues that a “sophisticated” participant will make a 
selection based on his knowledge of public perceptions, so that his selection is not 
based on whom he believes to be the most beautiful woman, but on his beliefs about 
whom everyone else will view as the most beautiful. At an extreme level, then, he 
must also anticipate what other participants will think the average assessment will be 
(and so on into third-, fourth-, fifth-order expectations and beyond).  
More recently, models incorporating higher-order expectations have received 
increasing attention, particularly as a rational explanation for the observation of asset 
bubbles.
8
 For instance, Allen, Morris, and Shin (2006) argue that bubbles occur when 
investors place too much weight on public signals, an outcome resulting from 
investors forming expectations about the average opinion of other investors. This can 
cause prices to depart from fundamental value (especially) after a public information 
event. Balakrishnan et al. (2012) empirically investigate this notion and find evidence 
consistent with analyst recommendation concentration driving or reflecting higher-
                                                 
8
 There is a growing theoretical literature incorporating higher-order beliefs in analyzing how investors 
learn from prices. This short review is meant as an introduction to these theoretical concepts in the 
context of this paper’s research question, and is by no means exhaustive. In particular, a large 
theoretical literature focuses on difference of opinion models, rather than the rational expectation 
model that motivates my research question. For a more detailed explanation of the distinction between 




order beliefs during the tech bubble. In this case, recommendation concentration 
serves as a precise public signal of the average opinion. Hence, a positive association 
between recommendation concentration and bubble continuation is suggestive of a 
rational speculative bubble. 
 Gao (2008) motivates his model by highlighting the potential implications of 
accounting disclosure for market efficiency in the context of a Keynesian beauty 
contest. In Gao’s (2008) model, disclosures play a dual role - the announcement plays 
an “information role” by conveying information about the fundamental value of the 
firm and a “commonality role” by revealing information common to all participants. 
Gao (2008) argues that the extent to which traders rely on public information is 
decreasing in the noise of the public signal, thus when signals are more precise, short-
horizon investors over-rely on the public signal due to its aforementioned dual-role.  
Kondor (2012) develops a framework in which a public announcement can 
reduce disagreement about fundamentals while increasing higher-order disagreement 
about price. He postulates that this result can occur if investors have heterogeneous 
trading horizons. More specifically, short-horizon investors will focus on 
intermediate price, rather than fundamentals. An informative earnings announcement 
more clearly reveals the consensus belief about firm value; short-horizon investors 
combine this public signal with their own private information to speculate on the 
intermediate stock price. Because the announcement increases the precision of the 
public signal, higher-order beliefs of short-horizon agents become more polarized.  
Although this study focuses on a rational expectation framework, difference-




update their beliefs. In general, these models rely on the notion that traders may agree 
to disagree because they consider their own beliefs to be more precise than the beliefs 
of others.In the extreme, a DO model can suggest that investors rely only on their 
private beliefs and do not condition on price at all to form their private valuations. As 
Banerjee (2011) summarizes, the REE channel implies a greater sensitivity of stock 
price to shocks in fundamentals than does the DO channel.
9
  
2.2 Earnings Announcements and Disagreement 
In addition to the large theoretical literature examining how public 
announcements affect disagreement, empirical studies both document that 
disagreement can occur after public announcements and examine the potential 
consequences of opinion divergence. For example, Kandel and Pearson (1995) find 
that earnings announcements can generate trading volume even in the absence of a 
price change and document increasing forecast dispersion around some earnings 
announcements. More recently, Rees and Thomas (2010) document increasing 
dispersion for 37.9% of earnings announcements in their sample over the period 
1993-2006. On average, however, earnings announcements are associated with a 
reduction in uncertainty. Patell and Wolfson (1979, 1981) are the first to provide 
evidence of a predictable pattern of implied volatility around earnings 
announcements. They describe the behavior of implied volatility assuming that 
instantaneous volatility is constant except for the disclosure date. Therefore, they 
                                                 
9
 Banerjee (2011) conducts additional empirical tests and finds evidence consistent with disagreement 
being positively associated with return volatility (i.e. greater conditioning on price) consistent with 
agents updating beliefs as in an REE framework. Similarly, Carlin et al. (2012) examine the 
implications of disagreement about mortgage prepayment spreads on asset pricing and also find 




develop a framework in which implied volatility is the highest just before the 
announcement; once the disclosure is made the implied volatility drops sharply under 
the assumption that there are no further anticipated information events remaining in 
the life of the option.
10
  
The pattern of implied volatility around earnings announcements is indicative 
of the option market’s expectation that the earnings announcement will be 
informative.
11
 The relation between uncertainty about the earnings signal and implied 
volatility is explored by Ajinkya and Gift (1985), who document a positive 
association between ex-ante levels of forecast dispersion and implied volatility
 
for a 
small 10-month sample, and Daley et al. (1988) who find a positive associated 
between forecast dispersion and implied volatility using 100 annual earnings 
announcements. Ajinkya and Gift (1985) propose that because stock price is a 
function of earnings expectations, the ex-ante estimate of earnings variance should be 
related to expected returns variance.
12
  What happens to the correlation between these 
measures upon a public disclosure, however, is ultimately an empirical question. 
                                                 
10
 More recently, Dubinsky and Johannes (2006) model implied volatility incorporating a jump at the 
time of the earnings announcement and empirically document a similar pattern of implied volatility 
around earnings announcements for the twenty firms with the most actively traded options over the 
period 1996-2003.  
11
 Ederington and Lee (1996) document an increase in implied volatility of Eurodollar, T-Bond, and 
Deutschemark options following unscheduled macroeconomic releases underscoring the importance of 
anticipation of announcements in generating the predictable pattern. Rogers et al. (2009) also 
document increasing implied volatility following sporadic management earnings guidance. 
12
 The use of forecast dispersion as a measure of uncertainty has been debated in the literature. For 
instance, both Abarbanell et al. (1995) and Barron et al. (1998) conclude that dispersion does not fully 
capture uncertainty while Zhang (2006) and Yeung (2009) offer empirical evidence consistent with 
dispersion capturing uncertainty. Similarly a large literature in economics finds conflicting regarding 
the association between uncertainty and dispersion (e.g. Zarnowitz and Lambros, 1987; Lahiri and 
Sheng, 2010). While dispersion may not perfectly capture uncertainty, its positive association with 





There is also a growing literature examining the role of disagreement in asset 
pricing. On the one hand, Miller (1977) argues that differences of opinion lead to 
overpricing in the presence of short-sale constraints. Diether, Malloy, and Scherbina 
(2002) document a negative association between levels of forecast dispersion and 
future returns, consistent with the notion of overpricing and a subsequent reversal. In 
a more direct test of the reversal implications of the Miller (1977) hypothesis, 
Berkman et al. (2009) find a negative association between ex-ante forecast dispersion 
and earnings-announcement period returns. However, investigating the relationship 
between the change in dispersion and earnings-announcement returns, both Berkman 
et al. (2009) and Rees and Thomas (2010) document a negative association – 
inconsistent with the expected reversal upon the revelation of fundamentals. 
Interestingly, Berkman et al. (2009) find the expected positive association when they 
measure disagreement using abnormal turnover, indicating the results are sensitive to 
the measurement of disagreement. A better understanding of when changes in 
fundamental uncertainty are negatively associated with changes in price uncertainty 
can perhaps address this apparent inconsistency.
13
 
On the other hand, a large theoretical literature argues that there is a positive 
risk premium for disagreement (i.e., Varian, 1989; David, 2008). Empirically, several 
studies document a positive association between dispersion and future returns (e.g., 
Qu et al., 2003; Anderson et al., 2005) and recently, Carlin, Longstaff, and Matoba 
                                                 
13
 Banerjee (2011) attempts to disentangle the DO and REE explanations and documents similar 
inconsistencies in the association between returns and disagreement proxied for by volume versus 
forecast dispersion. He concludes that while the evidence is consistent with a rational expectations 
framework, the conclusion depends on the disagreement proxy; he does not distinguish between price 




(2012) provide evidence that disagreement is priced - absent trading frictions - using 
disagreement about the prepayment speeds of mortgage backed securities.  
2.3 Investor Horizon 
Kondor (2012) demonstrates the theoretical implications of heterogeneous 
investor horizon for higher-order disagreement. Empirically, proxies for investor 
horizon rely on the detailed trading information required by 13F institutional 
investors.
14
  Perhaps unsurprisingly, prior research finds evidence that transient 
institutions have a short-term focus; for example, they overweight near-term expected 
earnings and under-weight long-term expected earnings (Bushee, 2001) and do not 
serve the same monitoring role as long-horizon institutions (Chen et al., 2007). While, 
in general, institutional trading is associated with more efficient pricing (e.g., Bartov 
et al., 2000; Collins et al., 2003; Boehmer and Kelley, 2009), studies investigating the 
pricing implications of short- horizon ownership suggest that these transient investors 
may exacerbate mispricing by overweighing public and/or private information (e.g., 
Daniel et al., 1998, 2001). Cremers, Pareek, and Sautner (2012) find that the presence 
of short-horizon institutional investors is related to the speculative component of 
stock price, measured as deviations from fundamentals, while Cella, Ellul, and 
Giannetti (2013) find that short-horizon ownership exacerbates overpricing during 
downturns.   
                                                 
14
 Empirical evidence is consistent with transient investors having different investment strategies than 
dedicated investors. For instance, transient investors exploit breaks in consecutive quarters of earnings 
increases (Ke and Petroni, 2004) and trade to exploit the post-earnings announcement drift (Ke and 
Ramalingegowda, 2005).  Bushee and Goodman (2007) find evidence consistent with transient 




Bushee and Noe (2000) find that short-horizon investors are attracted to firms 
with better disclosure practices. They argue that short-horizon investors are attracted 
to firms with better disclosure because these firms tend to have higher liquidity - 
enabling transient investors to take positions in the stock without impacting price and 
sacrificing trading gains. However, that short-horizon investors are attracted to more 
transparent disclosures while attempting to exploit mispricing is also consistent with a 
higher-order expectations argument in which the precision of the public signal makes 
short-horizon investors more confident in their own predictions. In addition, Bushee 
and Noe (2000) document a positive association between transient-institutional 
ownership and future volatility. My study compliments these findings by looking 
specifically at how transient ownership impacts the change in implied volatility 
around earnings announcements. 
Elliott, Krische, and Peecher (2010) consider the joint effects of short-horizon 
ownership and accounting transparency in an experimental setting. They ask a group 
of sixty-seven analysts to estimate the price and fundamental value of a stock while 
manipulating both the level of transparency of the financial statements (by varying 
the available-for-sale securities disclosure location) and the investor base (varying the 
classification of the “most important” investors between transient and dedicated). 
Their evidence is consistent with more transparent disclosure inducing a greater 
deviation of price from fundamentals when the most important investors are transient. 
They reason that analysts expect short-horizon investors to take actions that 
exacerbate mispricing perpetrated by unsophisticated investors when transparency is 




However, these results can also be explained through the lens of higher-order beliefs. 
As suggested by Sapra (2010), if transparency makes the accounting signal more 
precise, transient investors may overweight this signal (as in Allen et al., 2006) when 









Chapter 3: Hypothesis Development 
 
As described previously, Kondor’s (2012) rational expectations framework 
models higher-order disagreement as a consequence of agents’ heterogeneous 
investment horizons. In particular, short-horizon investors are interested in the 
intermediate price and hence, their primary concern is how other investors will value 
the asset in the short term. An announcement that increases the precision of the public 
signal by reducing disagreement about fundamentals will polarize the beliefs of these 
short-horizon investors by making them more confident in their private valuations. 
 In the “beauty contest” setting, the more precise the public signal the more 
investors will overweigh it (Allen, et al., 2006). Thus, in forming higher-order 
expectations, precise earnings signals become even more useful for predicting 
investors’ average beliefs. As the number of short-horizon investors increases, the 
effect will become more pronounced and higher-order beliefs about price will become 
even more polarized (Kondor, 2012). 
 Hence, an important first step in investigating how higher-order beliefs affect 
the relationship between price and fundamentals is to first establish empirically that 
the precision of the public signal can, in fact, increase disagreement about future price 
in the presence of short-horizon investors. My first hypothesis is therefore: 
H1a: Short-horizon ownership is positively associated with the both the  
         likelihood and extent of divergence between changes in disagreement  
         about fundamentals and price. 
 
A key assumption in Kondor’s (2012) model is that short horizon investors are 
endowed with heterogeneous private information. When the correlation of private 




leads to a polarization of higher-order beliefs.
15
 This private information can result 
from differential information processing skills or else the announcement may render 
prior private information more useful (Kim and Verrecchia, 1997).  
A firm with low idiosyncratic earnings volatility is characterized by earnings 
that commove closely with the earnings of firms in the same industry, or with 
earnings at the market level. Hence, higher idiosyncratic earnings volatility reflects 
the ability of investors to obtain or develop heterogeneous private beliefs about future 
earnings and captures the appeal of speculation around earnings announcements for 
firms whose earnings contain more firm-specific news.
16
 Therefore, my next 
hypothesis is a follows: 
H1b: Idiosyncratic earnings volatility is positively associated with the both  
         the likelihood and extent of divergence between changes in disagreement    
         about fundamentals and price. 
 
Although, on average, uncertainty decreases around earnings announcements, 
evidence suggests that the nature of the earnings news affects its informativeness. 
Isakov and Perignon (2000) distinguish between the effects of good news and bad 
news on the behavior of implied volatility using a framework similar to that of Patell 
and Wolfson (1981). In their model, the combined leverage and volatility feedback 
effects exacerbate the decrease in implied volatility for good news announcements 
while mitigating the decrease for bad news announcements allowing for the 
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 In particular, Kondor’s (2012) theoretical results rely on a weakly correlated information structure; 
for example short horizon investors may have private information about a different facet of 
fundamental value than do long-horizon investors. 
16
 For instance, Gong et al. (2013) find that managers are more likely to issue management forecasts 
when earnings synchronicity is low. They posit that managers provide these forecasts in an effort to 




possibility that public announcements can, to some extent, increase uncertainty.
17
 
Consistent with this model, Truong, Corrado, and Chen (2012) find that the predicted 
decrease in implied volatility following earnings announcement is mitigated for 
announcements characterized by a negative earnings surprise. Examining the 
behavior of implied volatility following management guidance, Rogers, Skinner, and 
Van Buskirk (2009) document that uncertainty increases following bad news 
forecasts, particularly when the firm releases forecasts sporadically. However, it is 
unclear what role, if any, higher-order disagreement plays in exacerbating or 
mitigating increased uncertainty.   
Kondor (2012) and Allen et al. (2006) both suggest that the precision of the 
public signal is important in generating higher-order disagreement. Similarly, Gao 
(2008) describes the dual role of accounting disclosure in the context of a Keynesian 
beauty contest as being both a source of information about the fundamental value of 
the firm as well as revealing the common component of investors’ information sets. 
The qualities of “bad” news may render it less useful in its information role even if 
the announcement does decrease uncertainty about future earnings. For instance, bad 
news tends to be less persistent than good news (i.e., Basu, 1997). On the other hand, 
Kondor (2012) argues that the precision role of the announcement dominates the 
news role – in other words, there does not need to be a change in the consensus to 
improve the precision of the signal and induce higher-order disagreement. Still, short-
sale constraints may render the price a less useful indicator of average valuation in the 
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 The volatility feedback effect refers to the tendency of a high volatility day to be followed by 
another high volatility day while the leverage effect suggests that volatility increases more after a 




case of bad news if these announcements engender pessimism. Therefore, I state my 
final hypothesis in the null form:  
H2: The association between speculation (measured as short-horizon  
       ownership and idiosyncratic earnings volatility) and the extent of      
       divergence between changes in disagreement about fundamentals and  
         price is not significantly different between “good news” and “bad news”  






Chapter 4: Sample Selection and Variable Measurement 
4.1 Sample Selection 
Table 1, Panel A outlines the sample selection criteria. The initial sample 
includes all quarterly earnings announcements from the intersection of Compustat and 
CRSP with available forecast data from the I/B/E/S Details file for the period 1996-
2010.
18
 For each firm-announcement observation, I require at least three qualifying 
forecasts from IBES for the current- and next- quarter’s earnings, where a qualifying 
forecast is made no more than ninety days in advance of the earnings announcement. 
Requiring three forecasts ensures less measurement error in the calculation of 
dispersion, and will reduce noise in classifying announcements as good- or bad- 
news. 
Next, I merge the I/B/E/S sample with OptionMetrics’ Standardized Option 
dataset, requiring non-missing implied volatilities for option durations of 122 days. I 
eliminate announcement dates with missing announcement period returns from the 
CRSP daily stock file, or where the next announcement date occurs more than 120 
days from the current earnings announcement date. Finally, following prior literature, 
I eliminate extreme forecast observations where the scaled change in forecast 
dispersion or the scaled forecast error are in the top or bottom 1% of observations 
(Rees and Thomas, 2010). This results in a sample of 56,313 firm-quarters. 
Finally, I screen the sample based on the availability of data to calculate the 
control variables. Requiring book value, market value of equity, and debt data from 
Compustat eliminates 1,241 observations, while 5,858 additional firm quarters are 
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missing the requisite data to calculate the earnings persistence and unpredictability 
parameters. This leaves 49,211 firm-quarters for the multivariate regression analysis 
of Hypothesis 1a. Requiring available idiosyncratic earnings volatility data reduces 
the sample to 42,017 firm-quarters for tests of Hypothesis 1b. The yearly breakdown 
of observations is presented in Table 1, Panel B.  
[Insert Table 1] 
4.2 Variable Definitions 
4.2.1 Measuring Disagreement about Fundamentals 
The primary analysis employs analyst forecast dispersion to proxy for 
disagreement about fundamentals.
19
 Decreasing (increasing) forecast dispersion 
around earnings reflects converging (diverging) beliefs about future earnings 
consistent with increasing (decreasing) precision of public information.  
I measure analyst forecast dispersion for quarter t (DISP) as the standard 
deviation of forecasts made within 90 days of the earnings announcement date 
(EAD). If an analyst makes more than one forecast during that period, I use only the 
most recent forecast. I scale dispersion by the stock price at the end of the current 
quarter. Analyst forecast dispersion for next quarter (DISPt+1) is measured three days 
before and after the earnings announcement date for the current quarter. In the “pre” 
period, I again limit forecasts to those made within 90 days of the quarter t 
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 Aside from forecast dispersion, there are several additional analyst-based constructs for uncertainty 
suggested in the literature. Barron et al. (1998) develop the BLKS measure by decomposing forecast 
dispersion into uncertainty and information asymmetry components. However, this measure utilizes 
realized forecast errors and hence suffers from look-ahead bias. Sheng and Thevenot (2012) implement 
a GARCH model to estimate the variance of mean forecast errors, however this measure requires a 
long time series without missing observations. As noted by Sheng and Thevenot (2012), although 
analyst dispersion understates uncertainty relative to theirs and the BLKS measures, it can still serve as 




announcement date. In the “post” period, I include forecasts for quarter t+1 made in 
the 30 days following the quarter t announcement date. If an analyst does not revise 
her forecast during the “post” period, I maintain the “pre” period forecast. I follow 
Rees and Thomas (2010) and measure the change in dispersion (ΔDISP) as the post-
EAD dispersion less the pre-EAD dispersion for quarter t+1 earnings, scaled by stock 
price at the end of quarter t. 
20
 
4.2.2 Measuring Disagreement about Price 
The use of implied volatility (hereafter, IV) to measure changes in 
disagreement about price is appropriate in this context for several reasons. First, 
implied volatility is a forward looking measure and therefore better reflects 
uncertainty about future stock price than do historical realizations such as stock price 
volatility. Second, the daily availability of implied volatility facilitates the 
measurement of short-window changes. Additionally, IV can be measured for options 
of various maturities enabling comparison between the horizon of the earnings 
forecasts (i.e. next quarter’s earnings) and the horizon of disagreement about price. 
Finally, measures based on stock market realizations may not fully capture 
disagreement stemming from private beliefs. For instance, using realized trading 
volume captures only the trades that actually occur (i.e., two parties agree on price). If 
an order is not executed, it is not measured (Garfinkel, 2009). In the options market, 
investors can speculate on future price without having to execute a trade in the 
underlying security. Additionally, option markets are not subject to the same short 
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 Results are robust to using unscaled forecast dispersion, scaling by mean forecast (for those firm-
quarters with non-zero mean forecasts), or calculating the percentage change (for firm-quarters with 




sale constraints that can cause distortions in stock prices when pessimistic investors 
are shut out of the market (i.e., Miller, 1977). 
Following Rogers et al. (2009), I obtain implied volatilities from the 
OptionMetrics Standardized Options dataset. This dataset provides daily put and call 
implied volatilities for at-the-money options with constant durations of 30 – 730 days. 
OptionMetrics calculates the interpolated implied volatilities using options with 
various strikes and maturities, and only calculates implied volatility if there exists 
enough underlying option price data to accurately calculate an interpolated value. An 
advantage of the Standardized Option dataset is that it eliminates the necessity to 
make a potentially arbitrary decision on which strike price and maturity to use in 
assigning implied volatility values to an earnings announcement observation. 
Additionally, the use of standardized options with fixed durations avoids the 
mechanical changes in implied volatility occurring as options draw closer to 
expiration (Patell and Wolfson, 1981). I calculate implied volatility three days before 
and after the earnings announcement date by averaging the implied volatility of put 
and call options with durations of 122 days (IV122).
21
 Changes in IV122 are 
calculated as:  
ΔIV122 = log(
        
        
) 
I choose 122-day options for the change analysis in order to better align the 
horizon of the option contract with that of the earnings forecast. Using 122-day 
                                                 
21




options ensures that the implied volatility after the earnings announcement date is at 
least partially capturing uncertainty about the next earnings announcement.
22
 
4.2.3 Measuring Divergence 
I create two variables that reflect whether and to what extent the change in 
dispersion and the change in implied volatility diverge around the announcement. 
DIFF_IND is an indicator variable equal to 1 if a decrease (increase) in dispersion is 
accompanied by an increase (decrease) in implied volatility.
23
  In addition to this 
dichotomous measure, I construct a continuous measure that reflects the extent of 
divergence.   
First, I decile-rank ΔDISP and ΔIV122 each quarter and then measure DIFF as 
follows: 
DIFFi,t = ΔIV122_Decilei,t  - ΔDISP_Decilei,t 
DIFF takes a value from -9 to +9; a DIFF value of -9 (9) reflects the greatest increase 
(decrease) in dispersion coupled with the greatest decrease (increase) in implied 
volatility. The empirical analysis employs an absolute value of DIFF to capture the 
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 A potential concern is that earnings announcement dates are not known with certainty a quarter in 
advance, so even with dropping firm-quarters in which the next announcement date is more than 120 
days away, ex ante it isn’t clear that investors know the next announcement will be within 120 days. In 
the sample, the average number of days until the next announcement is 92, and 90% of the next 
announcement dates are within 105 days suggesting investors likely expect the next EAD to be in less 
than 120 days 
23
 For the 1,175 firm-quarters for which the change in dispersion is zero, the change is classified with 




4.2.4 Measuring Speculation 
I measure short-horizon institutional ownership (SHORT_HORIZON) using 
the percentage ownership of institutions categorized as transient under Bushee’s 
(2001) classification scheme. Bushee (2001) categorizes institutions as “transient,” 
“quasi-indexers,” or “dedicated” based on portfolio turnover and diversification.
24
 I 
merge this classification data with Thomson Reuter’s 13F data. The SEC requires that 
all investment managers with equity security holdings over $100 million file quarterly 
reports. These ownership filings occur at the end of each calendar quarter and 
therefore it is not possible to perfectly match ownership characteristics to the date of 
the earnings announcement. Because it is important to capture ownership as of the 
announcement date as closely as possible, institutional ownership is matched to the 
earnings announcement date based on the filing of the most recent calendar quarter 
end prior to the announcement. I merge this ownership data with CRSP and calculate 
SHORT_HORIZON as the shares held by transient institutions as a percentage of total 
shares outstanding as of the report date (i.e. calendar-quarter end). Total institutional 
ownership is similarly calculated as total shares held by institutions as a percentage of 
total shares outstanding. Consistent with prior research, I assign missing values of 
institutional ownership a value of zero.
25
  
Idiosyncratic earnings volatility (IDIO_EARN) is the standard deviation of the 
residuals from a regression of a firm’s quarterly earnings on industry and market 
earnings. Specifically, following Brown and Kimbrough (2011), I estimate the 
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 Brian Bushee’s classification data, as well as a description of the methodology, can be found at:  
http://acct.wharton.upenn.edu/faculty/bushee/IIclass.html 
25
 Because of the data requirements (minimum of three analyst forecasts and exchange traded options) 
the number of firm-quarters with no institutional ownership is unsurprisingly very small (115 firm-




following firm specific regression over the twenty quarters prior to the earnings 
announcement (requiring a minimum of 12 quarters of observations): 
ROAt = α + β1MKTROAt  + β2INDROAt + εt 
where ROAt is earnings before extraordinary items for firm i in quarter t scaled by 
total assets at the beginning of quarter t. INDROAt is weighted-average ROA for 
quarter t, measured as the sum of earnings before extraordinary items in quarter t 
scaled by the sum of lagged total assets, excluding firm i, for all Compustat firms in 
the same industry as firm i, with industry defined using the Fama-French 49-industry 
classifications. MKTROAt is the weighted-average ROA for quarter t for all 
Compustat firms excluding those in the same industry as firm i. IDIO_EARN is equal 
to the standard deviation of the error term of these firm specific regressions.  
4.2.5 Classifying Earnings News 
I classify earnings news as “good” or “bad” based on analyst forecast error for 
quarter t. Forecast Error (FE) is defined as actual EPS value reported by IBES less 
mean consensus forecast prior to the earnings announcement date, scaled by stock 
price at the end of quarter t, utilizing the same forecasts used in the measurement of 
DISP in section 4.2.1.  An announcement is classified as BAD_NEWS if forecast error 
is negative.  
4.3 Control Variables 
I control for factors that the extant literature has associated with forecast 
dispersion and implied volatility in order to better isolate the effect of speculation on 




REVISION is the forecast revision for next quarter’s earnings around the 
announcement of current quarter earnings measured as the post-announcement mean 
forecast less the pre- announcement mean forecasts, scaled by price at the end of 
quarter t. Revisions should capture the informativeness of current earnings for future 
earnings (e.g., Yeung, 2009), hence, I expect REVISION to be negatively associated 
with the change in forecast dispersion. To the extent that revisions are associated with 
an increase in precision of public information, I expect it to be positively association 
with |DIFF|. 
I calculate the firm-specific earnings persistence parameter (PERSISTENCE) 
as the AR(1) coefficient in a regression using seasonally differenced quarterly ROA, 
estimated over the twenty quarters prior to quarter t. I require firms to have data for 
12 of the 20 previous quarters. The standard deviation of the residuals of this same 
regression scaled by beginning of quarter price (UNPREDICT) measures the 
unpredictability of earnings. I control for earnings persistence because more 
persistent earnings should be more informative for future earnings; prior research 
finds that earnings persistence is positively associated with the earnings-response 
coefficient (e.g., Kormendi and Lipe, 1987; Easton and Zmijewski, 1989). I expect 
that firms with greater earnings persistence (unpredictability) have more (less) precise 
public information. On the other hand, to the extent that unpredictable earnings are 
associated with more gathering of private information, UNPREDICT may be 





I measure size (SIZE) as the market value of equity, where market value is 
measured as price multiplied by common shares outstanding as of the previous 
quarter end. Size can be a proxy for the information environment of the firm, thus 
larger firms should have lower uncertainty and less volatile returns. BM is the book 
value of common equity scaled by the market value of common equity at the 
beginning of quarter t and is another fundamental risk factor. I expect that BM is 
negatively associated with uncertainty about price. 
LOSS is an indicator variable equal to 1 if earnings per share reported by IBES 
is negative. Prior research has found that loss firms are difficult to forecast (Clement 
and Tse, 2005) and that earnings-response coefficients are lower for losses (Hayn, 
1995). If this is the case, the decrease in implied volatility may be mitigated following 
losses.   
DEBT is measured as the book value of debt scaled by the market value of 
equity plus the book value of debt at the beginning of quarter t. I control for leverage 
because Johnson (2004) suggests that, for levered firms, the option value of equity is 
increasing in the uncertainty about future cash flows. Due to the leverage effect, high 










Chapter 5:  Research Design 
 
In order to test the association between speculation and the likelihood and 
extent of divergence between changes in disagreement about price and fundamentals, 
I employ logistic and linear regression specifications utilizing the following 
equations:  
DIFF_INDi,t = α0 + α1SPECULATEi,t + α2INST_OWNi,t + α3DISPi,t +  
                        α4IV122i,t + α5BAD_NEWSi,t   + α6LOSSi,t  + α7REVISIONi,t +  
                        α8|FE|i,t + α9NUMi,t + α10UNPREDICTi,t + α11PERSISTi,t +  
                        α12DEBTi,t + α13BMi,t + α14SIZEi,t  + εi,t   (1)
                    
 
 |DIFF|i,t = α0 + α1SPECULATEi,t + α2INST_OWNi,t + α3DISPi,t + α4IV122i,t +  
     α5BAD_NEWSi,t   + α6LOSSi,t  + α7REVISIONi,t + α8|FE|i,t +      
     α9NUMi,t + α10UNPREDICTi,t + α11PERSISTi,t + α12DEBTi,t +  
     α13BMi,t + α14SIZEi,t  + εi,t                  (2)
                     
 
Equation 1 (2) is a logistic (linear) regression model where SPECULATE is either 
SHORT_HORIZON or IDIO_EARN or both together. Control variables are as defined 
in the previous section and are ranked into deciles each quarter for ease of 




 To test Kondor’s (2012) theoretical predictions, which rely on decreasing 
disagreement about fundamentals, tests of Hypotheses 1a and 1b estimate Equations 1 
and 2 on the subsample characterized by decreasing forecast dispersion. For tests of 
Hypothesis 2, I partition by whether the announcement contains good- or bad- news, 
conditional on decreasing forecast dispersion.  
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Chapter 6:  Empirical Results 
6.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 2, Panel A reports summary statistics for variables used in the main 
analysis. As expected, forecast dispersion and implied volatility both decrease on 
average. The high standard deviation of ΔDISP (0.144) relative to its mean (-0.012) is 
indicative of substantial variation in changes in fundamental disagreement across the 
sample. ΔIV displays similarly high variation with a mean and standard deviation of     
 -0.013 and 0.088, respectively. The mean forecast error is positive, consistent with 
firms most often meeting or beating analyst estimates (e.g., Bartov et al., 2002); firms 
miss analyst expectations in 29.8% of firm-quarters while approximately 12% of 
earnings announcements are losses. Requiring a minimum of three analyst forecasts 
and option market data skews the sample towards large, well-covered firms – average 
analyst following is 8.6. DIFF is normally distributed with a mean of 0, consistent 
with the expectation that changes in fundamental and price disagreement should most 
often move together; this provides validation of the DIFF measure and suggests that 
deviation from a DIFF of 0 is meaningful.   
 Table 2, Panel B reports the number of observations per “quadrant” based on 
whether forecast dispersion and implied volatility increase or decrease for the firm-
quarter observation. Not surprisingly, the most frequent outcome is a decrease in both 
forecast dispersion and implied volatility. An increase in implied volatility coupled 
with a decrease in forecast dispersion – the specific outcome described in Kondor’s 
(2012) theory – occurs in 22.7% of firm-quarters. 




 Table 3 presents Pearson and Spearman correlations between variables used in 
the main analysis. The relatively high correlation between SHORT_HORIZON and 
IDIO_EARN (0.29) is consistent with both capturing characteristics of speculation. 
Consistent with prior research, I find that pre-announcement levels of dispersion and 
implied volatility are significantly positively correlated (0.36). The positive 
correlation between absolutely forecast error and ex-ante forecast dispersion suggests 
that dispersion is an appropriate measure of uncertainty about earnings. 
[Insert Table 3] 
6.2 Multivariate Analysis 
6.2.1 Full Sample 
An important assumption of Kondor’s (2012) model is that public 
announcements decrease disagreement about fundamentals. Hence, direct tests of 
Hypotheses 1a and 1b are estimated using the decreasing dispersion subsample. 
However, for completeness, I first estimate Equations 1 and 2 utilizing the full 
sample. Table 4, Panel A presents results from Equation 1, which regresses the 
indicator variable for divergent changes in forecast dispersion and implied volatility 
(DIFF_IND) on short-horizon ownership or idiosyncratic earnings volatility as well 
as control variables described in Section 3. In models 1 and 3 (2), idiosyncratic 
earnings volatility (short-horizon ownership) is positively and significantly 
(marginally insignificantly) associated with the likelihood of divergence. While the 
dichotomous variable captures whether implied volatility increases (decreases) in the 
presence of decreasing (increasing) forecast dispersion, results using this binary 




Therefore, Panel B reports results using the continuous measure |    | as the 
dependent variable.
27
 In this analysis, I find that idiosyncratic earnings volatility is 
positively and significantly associated with |    | in models 1 and 3, although the 
coefficient on short-horizon ownership is insignificant.  
[Insert Table 4] 
6.2.2 Tests of Hypotheses 1a and 1b 
In order to test Hypotheses 1a and 1b, in my main analyses I estimate 
Equations 1 and 2 on the decreasing forecast dispersion subsample. Table 5 reports 
descriptive statistics for the sample partitioned by increasing or decreasing dispersion. 
Not surprisingly, the instance of negative forecast errors is greater for the increasing 
dispersion subsample consistent with bad news announcements containing less 
information about future earnings. Mean PERSISTENCE is higher for firm-quarters 
with decreasing dispersion suggestive of dispersion decreasing in response to 
announcements that are informative about future earnings. The significantly higher 
number of analysts in the decreasing dispersion sample is indicative of better 
information environments leading to greater reduction in uncertainty around earnings 
announcements.    
[Insert Table 5] 
Table 6, Panel A presents results of Equation 1 for the decreasing dispersion 
subsample. Consistent with predictions, coefficients on SHORT_HORIZON and 
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 Employing the absolute value of DIFF aids in the interpretation of results. Using raw values of 
DIFF, -9 (+9) represents maximum divergence in the case of increasing (decreasing) dispersion and 
decreasing (increasing) implied volatility. As such, a positive coefficient can actually reflect less 
divergence is occurring in the case of moving from -5 to -4 (for instance) making interpretation 
potentially difficult. Nevertheless, results using a signed measure of DIFF are qualitatively similar to 




IDIO_EARN are positive and significant in models 2 and 3, with values of 0.558 and 
4.740, respectively. When both proxies are included in model 1, they each remain 
significant suggesting that both short horizon ownership and heterogeneous private 
information are incrementally important in generating higher-order disagreement.  
Panel B of Table 6 reports results of this analysis employing the continuous 
measure,|    |. Here, as in Panel A, short-horizon ownership and idiosyncratic 
earnings volatility are positively and significantly associated with the extent of 
divergence with coefficients of 0.354 and 3.774, respectively. Again, both are 
significant in the joint specification (model 1). The results of this analysis are 
consistent with Hypotheses 1a and 1b and offer empirical evidence consistent with 
the assertion that short-horizon ownership and idiosyncratic earnings volatility 
exacerbate disagreement about price as disagreement about fundamentals decreases, 
consistent with speculation inducing higher-order disagreement as in Kondor (2012). 
Turning to the control variables, both PERSISTENCE and UNPREDICT are 
positively and significantly associated with |DIFF| in all models. The results are 
indicative of the earnings announcements of high-persistence firms containing more 
information about future earnings. At the same time, less predictable earnings 
engender more disperse beliefs about price, even after an informative earnings 
announcement. The positive coefficient on DEBT is consistent with the post-
announcement volatility crush being attenuated for high debt firms due to the 
leverage effect. SIZE and ANALYSTS, which both proxy for the information 
environment of the firm, are negatively associated with |DIFF|, suggestive of better 




price. BAD_NEWS is positively and significantly associated with |DIFF| in all 
specifications, in line with Truong et al.’s (2012) evidence that the decrease in 
implied volatility is attenuated for bad news announcements.  
[Insert Table 6] 
6.2.3 Good News and Bad News Subsamples 
Next, I partition the sample further and estimate regressions separately on 
good news and bad news announcement subsamples, conditional on decreasing 
forecast dispersion. Results in Table 7, Panel A for specifications using DIFF_IND as 
the dependent variable reveal that, consistent with predictions, the coefficients on 
SHORT_HORIZON and IDIO_EARN in models 3 and 5 (good news announcements) 
are positive and significant with values of 0.775 and 5.461; the coefficients are 
insignificant in the bad news subsample. Chi-squared tests reveal that the coefficients 
on SHORT_HORIZON are significantly greater for good news announcements than 
bad news announcements. Additionally, when SHORT_HORIZON and IDIO_EARN 
are both included, they each remain significantly positively associated with 
DIFF_IND in the good news subsample. Results are similar in Panel B which reports 
results using |DIFF|; the coefficient on SHORT_HORIZON and IDIO_EARN are 
positive and significant in both models 3 and 5 when they enter the equation alone 
(0.487 and 5.095, respectively), and in the joint model. Chi-squared tests reveal that 
the coefficients on IDIO_EARN in the good-news sample are significantly more 
positive than in the bad news sample, while for SHORT_HORIZON the coefficient is 
significantly more positive in model 3 (good news) than model 4 (bad news). There 




informative about future earnings resulting in less learning about fundamental value. 
Second, if bad news engenders pessimistic opinions, short sale constraints may keep 
these investors from trading. In this case, price is a biased estimate of the consensus 
belief and this lower precision signal does not induce as much higher-order 
disagreement. 





















Chapter 7:  Additional Analysis 
7.1 Measuring Disagreement with Abnormal Turnover 
 
While my main analysis employs implied volatility as to measure 
disagreement about price, in this section, I introduce abnormal trading volume as an 
alternate proxy of higher-order disagreement.  
Beginning with Beaver (1968), a large literature has used trading volume as a 
measure of individual investor expectations, and by extension, disagreement.
28
 A 
particularly noteworthy result found by Kandel and Pearson (1995) is that abnormal 
trading volume can exist without price fluctuations – a result consistent with volume 
reflecting opinion divergence. Since then, there have been a series of studies 
empirically linking disagreement to volume (i.e., Bamber and Cheon, 1995; Bamber 
et al., 1997; Garfinkel, 2009).                                                                                                         
In order to measure abnormal volume, I begin by calculating daily turnover 
(TO) as volume reported by CRSP divided by shares outstanding.
29
 Following prior 
literature, I adjust this value by subtracting the market turnover.
30
 MATO is the 
market-adjusted turnover averaged over the three days centered on the earnings 
announcement date: 
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 For a comprehensive review of this literature, see Bamber, Barron, and Stevens (2011).  
29
 NASDAQ volume reported in CRSP is adjusted following Gao and Ritter (2010): divide reporting 
volume by 2 prior to February 1, 2001; by 1.8 between February 1 and December 31, 2001; and by 1.6 
during 2002 and 2003. 
30




Where Voli,t and Sharesi,t  are daily volume and shares outstanding reported by CRSP, 
respectively, and Volt and Sharest  are daily values aggregated over the entire market.  
While this measure can capture disagreement at the time of the earnings 
announcement, it does not reflect whether the earnings announcement increases or 
decreases disagreement. Firms with high announcement period volume may simple 
have relatively high turnover. In other words, while MATO may be abnormal when 
compared to other firms, it may not represent an abnormal level of volume for the 
specific firm. In order to better capture whether the earnings announcement 
exacerbates disagreement, I follow Garfinkel and Sokobin (2006) and adjust the 
announcement period turnover by subtracting average turnover over a non-
announcement period. Specifically, I construct ΔMATO as follows: 
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Where the first term is MATO, and the second term is daily firm turnover adjusted by 
market turnover averaged over the fifty days ending five days before the earnings 
announcement.  
 Next, I create two variables, |DIFF_MATO| and |DIFF_ MATO| which are 
equal to the absolute value of the difference between the decile rank of MATO or 
ΔMATO, respectively, and the decile rank of ΔDISP. The predictions remain the same 
as the main analysis; specifically, I expect SHORT_HORIZON and IDIO_EARN to be 
positively associated with |DIFF_MATO| and |DIFF_ MATO| in the decreasing 
dispersion subsample, consistent with short horizon ownership and heterogeneous 





7.1.1 Empirical Results  
Table 8, Panel A reports results of regressions of |DIFF_MATO| on short-
horizon ownership and idiosyncratic earnings volatility estimated over the decreasing 
dispersion subsample. The results are consistent with the main analysis. In the joint 
model (1), the coefficients on SHORT_HORIZON and on IDIO_EARN are both 
positive and significant (5.330 and 6.367, respectively). Coefficients on 
SHORT_HORIZON and IDIO_EARN are positive and significant in models 2 and 3 
(5.623 and 10.228, respectively). 
 Next, I conduct the same analysis using |DIFF_ΔMATO| which should better 
capture changing higher-order beliefs about price than does the level of abnormal 
volume. The results of regressions utilizing |DIFF_ΔMATO| in Panel B continue to be 
consistent with my hypotheses. For example, the coefficient on SHORT_HORIZON 
(IDIO_EARN) in model 2 (3) is 3.946 (5.919) and is significant at the 1% level.   
[Insert Table 8] 
7.2 Measuring Precision Using Returns 
 
If forecast dispersion does not sufficiently capture the change in disagreement 
about fundamentals (i.e. the precision of the public signal), this can bias the results. 
Gao (2008) suggests that when the public signal is more precise, short-horizon 
investors will rely on it more heavily resulting in an exaggerated earnings response. 
Therefore, I conduct additional analysis using absolute announcement period returns 
(|RET|) to proxy for the precision of public information. I measure |RET| as 
cumulative three day returns for days (-1, +1) around the earnings announcement 




|RET| into quintiles by quarter and regress the CH_IV122 on SHORT_HORIZON or 
IDIO_EARN and control variables. I expect that the association between CH_IV122 
and SHORT_HORIZON or IDIO_EARN will be stronger for announcements 
characterized by greater absolute returns. 
 Table 9 reports results from these regressions. Consistent with my predictions, 
the coefficients on SHORT_HORIZON and IDIO_EARN are significantly more 
positive for the sub-sample in the highest quintile of absolute announcement period 
returns than in the lowest quintile. For example, the coefficient on 
SHORT_HORIZON (IDIO_EARN) increases from 0.011 to 0.041 (0.008 to 0.179) and 
the difference is statistically significant at the 1% (5%) level.
31
 These results indicate 
that in the presence of more precise public signals, short horizon ownership and 
heterogeneous private beliefs (i.e. idiosyncratic earnings volatility) are more 
positively associated with disagreement about future price. 
[Insert Table 9] 
Table 10, Panels A and B repeat this analysis using abnormal volume to 
measure disagreement about price. As in Table 9, I partition the sample into quintiles 
of absolute announcement period returns (|RET|) and for each quintile, estimate 
regressions of MATO (Panel A) or ΔMATO (Panel B) on SHORT_HORIZON or 
IDIO_EARN and control variables. Again, the coefficients on SHORT_HORIZON and 
IDIO_EARN are significantly more positive for the top quintile of absolute returns 
than the bottom quintile – further evidence that the association between speculation 
and disagreement about price is stronger when the public signal is more precise.  
[Insert Table 10] 
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7.3 Robustness Tests 
7.3.1 Implied Volatility Horizon 
The choice of using 122-day standardized options is intended to better align 
the horizon of earnings uncertainty with price uncertainty. If higher-order beliefs 
about price are related to private information about future earnings, then the 
realization of these predictions can be expected to occur at the next announcement. 
Nevertheless, I repeat the main analysis using 30- 60- and 90- day standardized 
options in calculating |DIFF|. In untabulated results, I find evidence largely consistent 
with the main analysis. While the coefficient on SHORT_HORIZON is still positive 
and significant in the decreasing dispersion sample over all IV horizons, for the 30-
day horizon, IDIO_EARN remains positive but is insignificant. This result may occur 
if investors with private information about earnings do not expect the revelation of 














Chapter 8:  Conclusion 
 
This paper takes a first step to empirically examine the role of higher-order 
beliefs in explaining disagreement around earnings announcements and provides 
evidence consistent with the presence of speculative investors exacerbating 
disagreement about future price in reaction to informative earnings announcements. 
This evidence adds to the literature investigating the effect of opinion divergence on 
the capital market and offers a potential channel through which informative events 
can generate disagreement about price. 
Specifically, using forecast dispersion and implied volatility to proxy for 
disagreement about fundamentals and price, respectively, I document that short-
horizon ownership and idiosyncratic earnings volatility are significantly positively 
associated with the likelihood and extent of divergence between changes in 
disagreement about price and fundamentals around informative earnings 
announcements (i.e., those characterized by decreasing forecast dispersion). This 
result is consistent with the theoretical predictions of Kondor (2012) and 
demonstrates empirically that speculation can drive higher-order disagreement around 
public announcements. Further, I find that this effect is more pronounced for 
announcements that convey “good” news, suggesting the importance of the precision 
of the public signal in shaping higher-order beliefs. Employing trading volume as an 
alternative measure of disagreement about price yields results consistent with the 
main analysis.  
Opinion divergence in capital markets has received increasing attention in 




that speculation can result in an increase in disagreement about price while 
disagreement about fundamentals decreases underscores the importance of 
distinguishing between first- and higher-order disagreement in our understanding of 
the asset pricing consequences of opinion divergence. 
 Finally, the results have important implications for how the information 
content of earnings is measured and understood. The results suggest that even if firms 
disclose information with the intention of decreasing uncertainty, speculation 
resulting from heterogeneous investor horizons can increase uncertainty about price 
following an otherwise informative disclosure. Therefore, any effort to understand 
how disagreement changes around earnings announcements must take into 




















   Panel A: Sample Selection Criteria 
  





All Earnings Announcements Dates available  
from the intersection of CRSP and Compustat from  





Earnings Announcement Dates with IBES details data available 
 
214,210 





1) Number of analysts issuing qualifying forecasts  
     of quartet t or quarter t+1 earnings is less than 3
a
    (123,124) 
 
2) Non-availability of option data from Option Metrics  
     +/- three days around EAD (24,719) 
 






















    
 
Multivariate Sample Restrictions 
  
 








3) Missing Persistence 
 
(5,858) 
    
 




    
    
 




Number of firm-quarter 
announcement 
observations 






























































a See Appendix A for variable definitions b Extreme forecast observations defined as current scaled forecast 
error or scaled change in dispersion in the top or bottom 1% of observations c For Idiosyncratic Earnings 









Panel A: Descriptive Statistics, Full Sample 
  N Mean Std Q1 Median Q3 
       Δ DISP * 100 56,313 -0.012 0.144 -0.038 -0.004 0.016 
Δ IV 56,313 -0.013 0.088 -0.055 -0.014 0.023 
DISP * 100 56,313 0.168 0.368 0.028 0.069 0.170 
IV 56,313 0.456 0.209 0.307 0.412 0.558 
SHORT_HORIZON 56,313 0.188 0.117 0.103 0.167 0.251 
IDIO_EARN 43,390 0.015 0.018 0.005 0.009 0.019 
DIFF_IND 56,313 0.465 0.499 0.000 0.000 1.000 
DIFF 56,313 -0.004 3.988 -3.000 0.000 3.000 
MATO 56,130 0.011 0.026 -0.001 0.004 0.015 
Δ MATO 56,130 0.005 0.018 -0.001 0.001 0.006 
DIFF_MATO 56,130 -0.002 4.102 -3.000 0 3.000 
DIFF_∆MATO 56,130 0.005 4.034 -3.000 0 3.000 
FE *100  56,313 0.047 0.473 -0.015 0.035 0.150 
REV * 100 56,313 -0.072 0.382 -0.097 -0.007 0.028 
ANALYSTS 56,313 8.638 5.270 5.000 7.000 11.000 
BAD_NEWS 56,313 0.298 0.457 0.000 0.000 1.000 
LOSS 56,313 0.124 0.330 0.000 0.000 0.000 
BM 55,658 0.458 0.360 0.234 0.389 0.605 
SIZE 55,879 8158 18989 788.7 2027 6129 
DEBT 55,455 0.203 0.209 0.020 0.143 0.320 
PERSISTENCE 50,101 0.288 0.308 0.054 0.273 0.518 
UNPREDICT 50,095 0.142 0.350 0.013 0.039 0.125 
See Appendix A for variable definitions. Descriptive statistics using standardized options with a duration of 
122 days. 
 






















See Appendix A for variable descriptions. Pearson (Spearman) correlations below (above) diagonal. Bold coefficients indicate significance at the 10% level or better.  
  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 
 
1 ∆DISP 1.00 0.04 -0.04 -0.07 0.18 -0.02 -0.31 -0.07 -0.02 -0.01 0.00 -0.03 0.05 -0.06 -0.05 0.06 0.01 -0.06 -0.10 
2 ∆IV122 0.03 1.00 -0.03 -0.01 0.15 -0.01 -0.01 -0.13 -0.01 -0.03 0.01 -0.04 0.10 0.03 -0.01 -0.02 0.04 -0.01 -0.01 
3 SHORT HORIZON -0.02 -0.02 1.00 0.29 -0.01 0.01 0.04 0.27 0.56 0.06 0.07 -0.03 -0.09 0.02 -0.12 -0.22 -0.18 0.04 0.22 
4 IDIO EARN -0.04 0.00 0.22 1.00 -0.01 0.06 0.24 0.48 0.07 0.18 0.20 -0.13 0.02 0.29 -0.23 -0.43 -0.42 -0.05 0.81 
5 DIFF_IND 0.10 0.10 -0.01 0.01 1.00 0.62 -0.03 -0.03 -0.01 0.02 0.02 -0.02 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
6 |DIFF| -0.04 -0.01 0.00 0.07 0.62 1.00 0.13 0.07 -0.02 0.10 0.13 -0.04 0.03 0.08 0.06 -0.07 0.04 0.01 0.08 
7 DISP -0.29 0.01 0.01 0.15 -0.02 0.13 1.00 0.37 -0.06 0.60 0.64 0.03 0.18 0.36 0.41 -0.34 0.21 0.08 0.43 
8 IV122 -0.05 -0.13 0.21 0.43 -0.02 0.09 0.36 1.00 0.06 0.26 0.33 -0.11 0.06 0.32 0.04 -0.52 -0.19 0.10 0.51 
9 INST OWN 0.00 -0.01 0.55 -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 -0.06 0.01 1.00 -0.06 -0.02 0.04 -0.06 -0.08 -0.04 -0.06 -0.06 0.03 0.01 
10 |FE| 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.13 0.02 0.11 0.48 0.28 -0.07 1.00 0.52 -0.06 0.05 0.27 0.31 -0.28 0.16 0.04 0.32 
11 REVISION 0.04 0.04 0.02 0.12 0.01 0.11 0.56 0.31 -0.03 0.45 1.00 -0.03 0.19 0.26 0.31 -0.29 0.12 0.09 0.33 
12 ANALYSTS -0.01 -0.03 -0.05 -0.11 -0.02 -0.05 0.00 -0.08 0.02 -0.06 -0.03 1.00 -0.02 -0.06 -0.02 0.44 0.04 0.02 -0.13 
13 BAD NEWS 0.05 0.09 -0.08 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.14 0.07 -0.06 0.12 0.16 -0.02 1.00 0.12 0.08 -0.09 0.06 0.01 0.04 
14 LOSS -0.07 0.03 0.02 0.34 0.02 0.09 0.38 0.35 -0.08 0.32 0.27 -0.05 0.12 1.00 0.02 -0.28 -0.02 0.04 0.34 
15 BM -0.03 -0.01 -0.12 -0.18 -0.01 0.07 0.32 0.13 -0.05 0.30 0.28 -0.02 0.08 0.07 1.00 -0.23 0.38 0.04 -0.02 
16 LOG SIZE 0.05 -0.02 -0.22 -0.37 0.00 -0.09 -0.25 -0.46 -0.07 -0.24 -0.23 0.46 -0.09 -0.28 -0.23 1.00 0.13 -0.09 -0.50 
17 DEBT 0.01 0.02 -0.16 -0.31 0.01 0.06 0.23 -0.09 -0.09 0.19 0.13 -0.01 0.07 0.02 0.36 0.05 1.00 -0.11 -0.24 
18 PERSIST -0.04 -0.01 0.02 -0.06 -0.01 0.02 0.05 0.08 0.03 0.02 0.06 0.03 0.01 0.04 0.04 -0.09 -0.09 1.00 -0.10 






Relationship between Speculation and Divergence 
 
Panel A: Relationship between Speculation and DIFF_IND 
 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE = DIFF_IND 
VARIABLES 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
        











INST OWN -0.008* -0.010** -0.005 
 
(0.066) (0.014) (0.160) 
DISP -0.038 -0.026 -0.040 
 
(0.427) (0.569) (0.398) 
IV -0.244*** -0.263*** -0.231*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
BAD NEWS 0.061** 0.051** 0.059** 
 
(0.024) (0.040) (0.027) 
LOSS 0.107*** 0.119*** 0.104*** 
 
(0.003) (0.000) (0.004) 
UNPREDICT -0.098* -0.010 -0.099* 
 
(0.055) (0.826) (0.051) 
PERSISTENCE -0.014 -0.009 -0.015 
 
(0.624) (0.739) (0.597) 
DEBT 0.058 0.030 0.058 
 
(0.145) (0.383) (0.143) 
BM -0.022 -0.043 -0.028 
 
(0.536) (0.214) (0.437) 
SIZE -0.017 -0.070 -0.021 
 
(0.731) (0.139) (0.663) 
ANALYSTS -0.123*** -0.101*** -0.123*** 
 
(0.001) (0.005) (0.001) 
REVISION -0.022 -0.044 -0.020 
 
(0.552) (0.213) (0.595) 
|FE| 0.170*** 0.163*** 0.171*** 
 
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002) 
Intercept -0.035 0.022 -0.025 
 
(0.582) (0.702) (0.689) 
    Observations 42,017 49,211 42,017 
Pseudo R
2 





Table 4, continued 
 
Panel B: Relationship between Speculation and |DIFF| 
  DEPENDENT VARIABLE = |DIFF| 
    VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) 
        











INST OWN -0.004 -0.003 -0.006 
 
(0.457) (0.486) (0.219) 
DISP 0.693*** 0.638*** 0.694*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
IV 0.381*** 0.401*** 0.373*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
BAD NEWS 0.008 -0.000 0.008 
 
(0.783) (0.999) (0.762) 
LOSS 0.163*** 0.187*** 0.164*** 
 
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001) 
UNPREDICT 0.079 0.104* 0.080 
 
(0.228) (0.069) (0.224) 
PERSISTENCE 0.059 0.069** 0.060 
 
(0.128) (0.047) (0.122) 
DEBT 0.208*** 0.185*** 0.208*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
BM 0.127*** 0.112*** 0.130*** 
 
(0.003) (0.006) (0.002) 
SIZE 0.104 0.063 0.107 
 
(0.117) (0.304) (0.108) 
ANALYSTS -0.299*** -0.263*** -0.299*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
REVISION -0.164*** -0.185*** -0.165*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
|FE| 0.337*** 0.336*** 0.336*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Intercept 2.419*** 2.495*** 2.414*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
    Observations 42,017 49,211 42,017 
Adjusted R
2 
0.036 0.034 0.036 
See Appendix A for variable descriptions. Panel A (B) is a logistic (linear) regression. 
Control variables are decile ranked by quarter. P-values in parentheses are based on 
standard errors clustered by firm and announcement month. ***,**,* reflects statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  
 
 













N Mean Median 
 
N Mean Median 
t-statistic 
(mean) 
         Δ DISP * 100 23,935 0.072 0.024 
 
32,378 -0.074 -0.029 136.9*** 
Δ IV 23,935 -0.010 -0.011 
 
32,378 -0.016 -0.016 7.400*** 
DISP * 100 23,935 0.168 0.069 
 
32,378 0.168 0.07 -0.1196 
IV 23,935 0.458 0.410 
 
32,378 0.455 0.412 1.94* 
SHORT_HORIZON 23,935 0.183 0.163 
 
32,378 0.188 0.169 -4.66*** 
IDIO_EARN 18,108 0.015 0.009 
 
24,657 0.016 0.009 -0.128 
DIFF_IND 23,935 0.581 1 
 
32,378 0.379 0 48.70*** 
|DIFF| 23,935 3.311 3 
 
32,378 3.141 3 8.45*** 
FE *100  23,935 0.027 0.032 
 
32,378 0.063 0.037 -8.90*** 
REV * 100 23,935 -0.089 -0.009 
 
32,378 -0.060 -0.006 -8.76*** 
ANALYST 23,935 7.355 6 
 
32,378 8.054 7 -16.99*** 
BAD_NEWS 23,935 0.327 0 
 
32,378 0.276 0 13.17*** 
LOSS 23,935 0.122 0 
 
32,378 0.126 0 -1.6 
BM 23,621 0.457 0.389 
 
32,037 0.454 0.388 1.09 
LOG_SIZE 23,726 7.735 7.581 
 
32,153 7.794 7.64 -4.62*** 
DEBT 23,562 0.211 0.150 
 
31,893 0.197 0.138 8.09*** 
PERSISTENCE 21,049 0.274 0.254 
 
29,052 0.298 0.287 -8.75*** 
UNPREDICT 21,044 0.001 0 
 
29,051 0.001 0 -1.76* 
See Appendix A for variable definitions. Sample is partitioned by whether forecast dispersion is increasing or decreasing 
around the earnings announcement, if there is no change, the observation is included in the decreasing sample. ***, **, * 






Relationship between Speculation and Divergence for Decreasing Dispersion Subsample 
 
Panel A: Relationship between Speculation and DIFF_IND 
 DEPENDENT VARIABLE = DIFF_IND 
VARIABLES 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
        











INST OWN -0.008 -0.012* 0.002 
 
(0.300) (0.085) (0.739) 
DISP 0.277*** 0.263*** 0.269*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
IV -1.281*** -1.336*** -1.233*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
BAD NEWS 0.227*** 0.221*** 0.224*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
LOSS 0.317*** 0.341*** 0.306*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
UNPREDICT 0.156* 0.314*** 0.151* 
 
(0.082) (0.000) (0.088) 
PERSISTENCE 0.127*** 0.150*** 0.123*** 
 
(0.003) (0.000) (0.004) 
DEBT 0.084 0.073 0.087 
 
(0.189) (0.179) (0.169) 
BM -0.090 -0.148** -0.110* 
 
(0.158) (0.018) (0.075) 
SIZE -0.407*** -0.504*** -0.422*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
ANALYSTS -0.175*** -0.141*** -0.177*** 
 
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) 
REVISION -0.370*** -0.421*** -0.362*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
|FE| -0.094 -0.112** -0.091 
 
(0.108) (0.036) (0.117) 
Intercept 0.131 0.254*** 0.163 
 
(0.222) (0.010) (0.134) 
    Observations 24,251 28,564 24,251 
Pseudo R
2 








Table 6, continued 
 
Panel B: Relationship between Speculation and |DIFF| 
  DEPENDENT VARIABLE = |DIFF| 
VARIABLES 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
        











INST OWN -0.012* -0.011* -0.003 
 
(0.099) (0.097) (0.659) 
DISP 0.967*** 0.873*** 0.960*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
IV -0.798*** -0.763*** -0.752*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
BAD NEWS 0.237*** 0.235*** 0.234*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
LOSS 0.454*** 0.473*** 0.444*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
UNPREDICT 0.343*** 0.445*** 0.338*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
PERSISTENCE 0.168*** 0.181*** 0.164*** 
 
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001) 
DEBT 0.241*** 0.216*** 0.244*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
BM 0.035 -0.016 0.016 
 
(0.565) (0.789) (0.797) 
SIZE -0.410*** -0.463*** -0.423*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
ANALYSTS -0.293*** -0.255*** -0.295*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
REVISION -0.637*** -0.674*** -0.630*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
|FE| 0.180*** 0.170*** 0.183*** 
 
(0.007) (0.005) (0.006) 
Intercept 3.022*** 3.147*** 3.052*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
    Observations 24,251 28,564 24,251 
Adjusted R
2 
0.071 0.068 0.070 
See Appendix A for variable descriptions. Panel A (B) reports results of logistic 
(linear) regressions estimated for firm-quarters characterized by decreasing 
dispersion. Control variables are decile ranked by quarter. P-values in parentheses 
are based on standard errors clustered by firm and announcement month. ***,**,* 






Relationship between Speculation and Divergence for Good News and Bad News Subsamples 
 
Panel A: Relationship between Speculation and DIFF_IND 
  DEPENDENT VARIABLE = DIFF_IND 
 
















          
SHORT HORIZON 0.712*** 0.064 0.775*** 0.043     
 
(0.007) (0.868) (0.001) (0.904)     
IDIO EARN 5.053*** 2.987 
 




  (0.002) (0.178) 
INST OWN -0.006 -0.010 -0.010 -0.015 0.008 -0.009 
 
(0.531) (0.382) (0.230) (0.200) (0.301) (0.324) 
DISP 0.528*** -0.374*** 0.489*** -0.345*** 0.517*** -0.375*** 
 
(0.000) (0.003) (0.000) (0.003) (0.000) (0.003) 
IV -1.229*** -1.410*** -1.301*** -1.423*** -1.158*** -1.405*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
LOSS 0.290*** 0.359*** 0.316*** 0.376*** 0.270*** 0.358*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
UNPREDICT 0.143 0.221 0.318*** 0.340*** 0.133 0.221 
 
(0.151) (0.113) (0.000) (0.002) (0.179) (0.114) 
PERSISTENCE 0.126** 0.133* 0.163*** 0.123* 0.121** 0.133* 
 
(0.018) (0.063) (0.001) (0.072) (0.024) (0.063) 
DEBT 0.070 0.121 0.045 0.151 0.071 0.122 
 
(0.332) (0.242) (0.471) (0.105) (0.327) (0.233) 
BM -0.046 -0.177* -0.096 -0.251*** -0.075 -0.179* 
 
(0.542) (0.068) (0.179) (0.006) (0.319) (0.059) 
SIZE -0.269** -0.719*** -0.399*** -0.744*** -0.290*** -0.720*** 
 
(0.013) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.007) (0.000) 
ANALYSTS -0.228*** -0.028 -0.173*** -0.038 -0.230*** -0.028 
 
(0.001) (0.745) (0.005) (0.644) (0.001) (0.744) 
REVISION -0.328*** -0.353*** -0.382*** -0.407*** -0.321*** -0.351*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
|FE| -0.308*** 0.416*** -0.327*** 0.405*** -0.303*** 0.417*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Intercept -0.043 0.737*** 0.101 0.803*** 0.005 0.740*** 
 
(0.725) (0.000) (0.370) (0.000) (0.969) (0.000) 
  
          
Observations 17,441 6,810 20,666 7,898 17,441 6,810 
Pseudo R
2 
0.017 0.023 0.019 .0254 0.017 0.023 
χ
2
 HOR GOOD=BAD 2.38* 4.07** 
 χ
2 







Table 7, continued 
Panel B: Relationship between Speculation and |DIFF| 
 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE = |DIFF| 
 














              
SHORT HORIZON 0.607*** 0.082 0.487** -0.079 
  
 
(0.004) (0.822) (0.011) (0.817) 







INST OWN -0.010 -0.014 -0.009 -0.014 0.002 -0.012 
 
(0.223) (0.285) (0.243) (0.234) (0.761) (0.258) 
DISP 1.044*** 0.809*** 0.946*** 0.707*** 1.034*** 0.807*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
IV -0.679*** -1.138*** -0.656*** -1.061*** -0.618*** -1.132*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
LOSS 0.388*** 0.552*** 0.412*** 0.550*** 0.371*** 0.551*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
UNPREDICT 0.336*** 0.412*** 0.473*** 0.434*** 0.326*** 0.413*** 
 
(0.001) (0.005) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.005) 
PERSISTENCE 0.228*** 0.013 0.239*** 0.027 0.223*** 0.013 
 
(0.000) (0.889) (0.000) (0.763) (0.000) (0.893) 
DEBT 0.296*** 0.125 0.250*** 0.166 0.296*** 0.127 
 
(0.000) (0.250) (0.000) (0.114) (0.000) (0.247) 
BM 0.051 0.010 -0.005 -0.021 0.026 0.007 
 
(0.467) (0.938) (0.942) (0.859) (0.705) (0.958) 
SIZE -0.332*** -0.600*** -0.387*** -0.648*** -0.349*** -0.602*** 
 
(0.004) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.000) 
ANALYSTS -0.303*** -0.243** -0.254*** -0.242*** -0.306*** -0.243** 
 
(0.000) (0.016) (0.000) (0.009) (0.000) (0.016) 
REVISION -0.513*** -0.796*** -0.560*** -0.808*** -0.507*** -0.794*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
|FE| -0.078 0.678*** -0.090 0.681*** -0.074 0.678*** 
 
(0.281) (0.000) (0.178) (0.000) (0.305) (0.000) 
Intercept 2.837*** 3.639*** 2.979*** 3.711*** 2.877*** 3.643*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
       Observations 17,441 6,810 20,666 7,898 17,441 6,810
Adjusted R
2 
0.053 0.079 0.048 0.080 0.052 0.079 
χ
2
 HOR GOOD=BAD 2.17 3.21*   
χ
2 
IDIO GOOD=BAD 2.56*   3.06* 
See Appendix A for variable descriptions. Panel A (B) reports results of logistic (linear) regression model estimated for firm-
quarters characterized by decreasing dispersion. Control variables are decile ranked by quarter. P-values in parentheses are 
based on standard errors clustered by firm and announcement month. ***,**,* reflects statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, 





Relationship between Speculation and Divergence Using Abnormal Turnover 
  
Panel A: Relationship between Speculation and |DIFF_MATO| 
 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE = |DIFF_MATO| 
 
 
(3) (1) (2)  
        











INST OWN 0.015 0.013 0.122*** 
 
(0.273) (0.305) (0.000) 
DISP 0.705*** 0.726*** 0.668*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
BAD NEWS 0.038 0.015 0.000 
 
(0.254) (0.630) (0.995) 
LOSS -0.038 0.071 -0.104 
 
(0.706) (0.394) (0.310) 
UNPREDICT 0.578*** 0.772*** 0.668*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
PERSISTENCE 0.610*** 0.594*** 0.630*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
DEBT 0.094 -0.007 0.081 
 
(0.390) (0.949) (0.485) 
BM -0.105 -0.125 -0.355*** 
 
(0.301) (0.176) (0.001) 
SIZE -0.019 -0.088 -0.345** 
 
(0.900) (0.532) (0.027) 
ANALYSTS 0.679*** 0.698*** 0.712*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
REVISION -0.337*** -0.385*** -0.271*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
|FE| 0.750*** 0.775*** 0.798*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Intercept 0.563** 0.661*** 1.088*** 
 
(0.025) (0.006) (0.000) 
    Observations 24,196 28,487 24,196 
Adjusted R
2 





Table 8, continued 
Panel B: Relationship between Speculation and |DIFF_∆MATO| 
 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE = |DIFF_∆MATO| 
VARIABLES 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
        











INST OWN 0.036*** 0.036*** 0.113*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
DISP 0.374*** 0.402*** 0.348*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
BAD NEWS 0.018 0.015 -0.009 
 
(0.628) (0.659) (0.805) 
LOSS -0.303*** -0.238*** -0.351*** 
 
(0.001) (0.003) (0.000) 
UNPREDICT 0.759*** 0.881*** 0.823*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
PERSISTENCE 0.542*** 0.533*** 0.556*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
DEBT -0.119 -0.177** -0.128 
 
(0.178) (0.036) (0.166) 
BM -0.089 -0.077 -0.269*** 
 
(0.336) (0.371) (0.004) 
SIZE -0.359*** -0.384*** -0.594*** 
 
(0.002) (0.001) (0.000) 
ANALYSTS 0.266*** 0.284*** 0.290*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
REVISION -0.163*** -0.186*** -0.115** 
 
(0.003) (0.000) (0.035) 
|FE| 0.810*** 0.875*** 0.844*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Intercept 1.107*** 1.133*** 1.485*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
    Observations 24,196 28,487 24,196 
Adjusted R
2 
0.119 0.126 0.099 
See Appendix A for variable descriptions. Panels A and B report results of linear regressions estimated for 
firm-quarters characterized by decreasing dispersion. Control variables are decile ranked by quarter. P-values 
in parentheses are based on standard errors clustered by firm and announcement month. ***,**,* reflects 








Relationship between Speculation and Divergence Using an Alternative Measure of Precision 
 
 















      
 
    
SHORT HORIZON 0.011* 0.041*** 
   
 
(0.081) (0.000) 
   IDIO EARN 
   
0.008 0.179** 
    
(0.863) (0.012) 



































































































     χ
2
 HOR Q1=Q5 15.40 *** 





See Appendix A for variable descriptions. The sample is partitioned into 5 quintiles per quarter based on absolute 
announcement period return adjusted by cumulative CRSP value-weighted return for the same period. Control variables are 
decile ranked by quarter. P-values in parentheses are based on standard errors clustered by firm and announcement month. 







Relationship between Speculation and Divergence Using Abnormal Volume and  
An Alternative Measure of Precision 
 
Panel A: Relationship between Speculation and MATO by |RET| Quintile  
 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE = MATO 
 










          




  IDIO EARN 
  
0.092*** 0.295*** 
   
(0.000) (0.000) 
INST OWN 0.000*** -0.000 0.001*** 0.002*** 
 
(0.001) (0.618) (0.000) (0.000) 
BAD NEWS 0.000 0.002** -0.000 0.001 
 
(0.534) (0.033) (0.558) (0.436) 
LOSS -0.001 -0.003* -0.001 -0.005*** 
 
(0.353) (0.085) (0.102) (0.006) 
UNPREDICT 0.004*** 0.005*** 0.002*** -0.003 
 
(0.000) (0.008) (0.006) (0.208) 
PERSISTENCE 0.003*** 0.007*** 0.003*** 0.007*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
DEBT -0.002*** -0.005*** -0.001* -0.004** 
 
(0.001) (0.002) (0.074) (0.046) 
BM -0.002*** -0.011*** -0.002*** -0.014*** 
 
(0.003) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
SIZE -0.000 -0.003 -0.002** -0.006* 
 
(0.800) (0.284) (0.015) (0.057) 
ANALYST 0.005*** 0.014*** 0.005*** 0.014*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
REVISION -0.001 -0.009*** 0.000 -0.009*** 
 
(0.227) (0.000) (0.980) (0.000) 
|FE| 0.004*** 0.005*** 0.004*** 0.004** 
 
(0.000) (0.005) (0.000) (0.034) 
Intercept -0.009*** 0.001 -0.006*** 0.012*** 
 
(0.000) (0.701) (0.000) (0.004) 
     Observations 10,056 9,302 8,682 7,845 
Adjusted R-squared 0.235 0.145 0.169 0.094 
    χ
2
 HOR Q1=Q5 124.85*** 
  χ
2







Table 10, continued 
Panel B: Relationship between Speculation and ∆MATO by |RET| Quintile  
  DEPENDENT VARIABLE = ∆MATO 
 










          




  IDIO EARN 
  
0.008 0.162*** 
   
(0.472) (0.000) 
INST OWN 0.000** 0.000 0.000*** 0.002*** 
 
(0.028) (0.659) (0.000) (0.000) 
BAD NEWS -0.000 0.002*** -0.000** 0.002* 
 
(0.276) (0.006) (0.036) (0.096) 
LOSS -0.002*** -0.004*** -0.002*** -0.005*** 
 
(0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) 
UNPREDICT 0.000 0.002 0.000 -0.003 
 
(0.165) (0.294) (0.264) (0.136) 
PERSISTENCE 0.001** 0.004*** 0.001** 0.004*** 
 
(0.018) (0.002) (0.017) (0.003) 
DEBT -0.002*** -0.004*** -0.002*** -0.004*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.004) 
BM -0.001*** -0.009*** -0.002*** -0.012*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
SIZE -0.000 -0.005*** -0.002*** -0.007*** 
 
(0.315) (0.005) (0.001) (0.001) 
ANALYST 0.002*** 0.008*** 0.002*** 0.008*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
REVISION 0.000 -0.007*** 0.000 -0.007*** 
 
(0.652) (0.000) (0.236) (0.000) 
|FE| 0.002*** 0.004*** 0.002*** 0.003** 
 
(0.000) (0.003) (0.000) (0.035) 
Intercept -0.000 0.009*** 0.001 0.016*** 
 
(0.576) (0.001) (0.184) (0.000) 
     Observations 10,056 9,302 8,682 7,845 
Adjusted R-squared 0.087 0.105 0.063 0.070 
    χ
2
 HOR Q1=Q5 113.06*** 
  χ
2
 IDIO Q1=Q5 
  
23.20*** 
See Appendix A for variable descriptions. The sample is partitioned into 5 quintiles per quarter based on absolute 
announcement period return adjusted by cumulative CRSP value-weighted return for the same period. Control variables 
are decile ranked by quarter. P-values in parentheses are based on standard errors clustered by firm and announcement 








Appendix A: Variable Definitions 
 
   Variable  Definition 
Δ DISP  Change in Dispersion The change in the standard deviation of analyst individual forecasts of 
next quarter earnings around the announcement of current quarter 
earnings. Pre-announcement dispersion includes forecasts of quarter 
t+1 earnings made within 90 days of the announcement date of 
quarter t earnings. If multiple forecasts are made by a single analyst, 
only the most recent is used. The post announcement dispersion is 
measured using forecasts made in the 30 days following the earnings 
announcement date.  If an analyst has a qualifying pre-announcement 
forecast and does not revise it, it is carried forward to the post-period. 
The change is scaled by price at the end of quarter t. 
DISP Dispersion The standard deviation of analyst individual forecasts of current 
quarter earnings. Qualifying forecasts are made within 90 days of the 
earnings announcement. If an analyst makes more than one forecast 
during the 90 day period, only the most recent forecast is used. 
Dispersion is scaled by price at the end of the current quarter. 
Δ IV  Change in Implied 
Volatility 
The change in average implied volatility of 122- day expiration put 
and call options +/- 3 days from the earnings announcement date, 
from the Option Metrics Standardized Option dataset. Measured as 
log(post-IV/pre-IV)  
IV Implied Volatility Average implied volatility of  122- day expiration put and call options 
from the Option Metrics Standardized Option dataset.  
DIFF_IND Diff Indicator An indicator variable equal to 1 if an increasing (decrease) in 
dispersion is accompanied by a decrease (increase) in implied 
volatility. If Δ DISP is equal to zero, the observation is included with 
the decreasing dispersion sample. 
|DIFF| Absolute Difference  The absolute value of the difference between the decile of Δ IV and 






The percentage of shares held by transient institutions as of the most 
recent calendar quarter ending before the earnings announcement 
date, where transient institutions are identified using the classification 
of Bushee (2001).  
IDIO_EARN Idiosyncratic Earnings 
Volatility 
The standard deviation of the error term of the regression of ROA 
(earnings before extraordinary items scaled by lagged total assets) on 
value-weighted market ROA (not including members of firm i's 
industry based on Fama French 48 industries) and industry value-
weighted ROA (not including firm i) estimated over 20 quarters up to 








Appendix A, Continued 
 
Variable   Definition 
MATO  Market-Adjusted 
Turnover 
Daily turnover measured as volume from CRSP as a percentage of 
total shares outstanding, adjusted by the daily turnover for the entire 
market and averaged over the three days centered on the earnings 
announcement date 
∆MATO Change in Market 
Adjusted Turnover 
MATO adjusted by the average market adjusted turnover for the 50 
days ended 5 days before the earnings announcement date. 
|DIFF_MATO| Difference using 
MATO 
Absolute value of the decile rank of MATO less the decile rank of Δ 
DISP. MATO3 and Δ DISP  are ranked into deciles by quarter. 
|DIFF_∆MATO| Difference using 
∆MATO 
Absolute value of the decile rank of ∆MATO less the decile rank of Δ 
DISP. ∆MATO and Δ DISP  are ranked into deciles by quarter. 
FE Forecast Error Actual earnings reported by IBES less the mean of qualifying 
individual analyst forecasts for the current quarter. Forecast error is 
scaled by price at the end of the current quarter. 
REVISION Forecast Revision The change in the mean of qualifying individual forecasts for next 
quarter around the announcement of current quarter earnings, scaled 
by stock price at the end of quarter t. 
ANALYSTS Number of Analysts Measured as the natural log of the number of analysts making 
qualifying forecasts of current quarter earnings 
BAD_NEWS Bad News An indicator variable equal to one if forecast error is negative 
LOSS Loss An indicator variable equal to one if actual EPS reported by IBES is 
negative 
BM Book to Market Book value of common equity scaled by the market value of common 
equity at the end of the current quarter 
SIZE Size The natural log of Market value of equity measured as price 
multiplied by common shares outstanding at the beginning of qtr t 
DEBT Debt Measured as long term debt plus the debt in current liabilities scaled 
by the market value of equity plus the book value of debt  at the 
beginning of quarter t 
PERSIST Earnings Persistence The AR(1) coefficient from a regression of seasonally differenced 
ROA estimated over the twenty quarters prior to quarter t. Firms are 




The standard deviation of the residuals from the persistence 
regression defined above, deflated by price at the beginning of quarter 
t.  
RET Return 
3-day value-weighted market-adjusted return around the earnings 
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